Briefly: “Adolescent boys” was dumb; I do not generally agree that a willingness to discuss cultural and psychological features of political events automatically constitutes a reactionary “refus[al] to think politically”; I fell asleep the second time I tried to see Star Wars. With that, I move on to political violence. I apologize for the fact that the discussion will seem schematic and abstract.
I assume that ethical concern “for others” includes and assumes concern for members of oppressed classes; an inegalitarian view, on which some persons are “worth” more than others, is indefensible. Given that, the acceptance of extreme forms of political violence in pursuit of change becomes a live issue. By that term, I mean the form involving the killing (or life-altering debilitation) of persons who aren’t directly and obviously agents of oppression; I leave aside skinned knees, property, or on-duty agents of state power.
What must revolutionaries accept, to support such violence? First, that killing can be an acceptable means to an end. (I assume it’s not an end in itself.) If you reject the notion of an “economy” of violence, you’ll disembark here; suppose we don’t. One must then accept that:
(a) The end is worthy.
(b) The means are effective.
(c) No other means are at least as effective.
(a) A totally just society is a worthy end, if anything is. Where local or “partial” gains in justice are at issue, this is less clear; or should be for the “total” revolutionary, who must now explain why some “gradualist” goals, such as a change in status within an (ultimately unjust) civil society are worth pursuing. Achieving such goals might be a phase toward the ultimate end; but so might phases of state domination and control. The “total” revolutionary might as well take up arms on the state’s behalf. Resisting this conclusion requires accepting some degree of gradualism.
(b) Assuming the French rioters are pursuing a worthy end (partial or total, and admittedly unclear), is political violence an effective means to it? Both sides, I think, should agree that the answer is not obvious. For my part, I haven’t seen how isolated, seemingly “random” acts against Anglo-French individuals serve any tactical or strategic goal one might supply. Frustration (and even joy) is effectively conveyed by symbolic property violence; revenge is inutile and is likely misdirected. Massive escalation of such violence might have efficacy; but might also be counter-productive, both in making partial goals such as civil recognition less attainable, and in provoking the superior, as things stand, force possessed by the state.
(c) Could other means, life-respecting ones, be as effective? This is the question of liberalism. Here, I must remark on a feature of Josuha’s rhetoric. Given that there are difficulties (resting on failures of imagination) in describing the totally just society, and empirical evidence against the idea that a society claiming to be organized along principles he advocates will be totally just, Joshua is frank and consistent in calling his hopes and thinking “utopian.” On the other hand, those who hope or believe that worthy goals might be pursued by means other than political violence are gripped by “fantasy.” The first of these hopes is about an end, the second is about means to that (or some other) end. Beyond this, both hopes outstrip present evidence that they may be realized; to this extent, the difference between “utopian” and “fantastic” is largely connotative. This, I feel, is a push; and if one believes that partial goals have sometimes been effected non-violently, some will feel that the liberal wins in a tie.
But: Other things being equal, why should there be any preference for life-respecting means, “fantastic” of not? I cannot answer this fully here, but I will point to a consideration. Lives, unlike bits of property or perhaps opportunities, are not resources which can in any obvious way be traded or redistributed. A related ethical point is that they should not be treated as such. That they are, as things stand, often so treated, and that this is bad, are central to any version of Marxism that I can understand or begin to accept. One need not hypostasize “rights” to life, or speak of human nature, to make this point; I speak merely of the sort of value – which may not be all that it might -- that the lives of actual men and women, of whatever class, have to them here and now. I suggest that any Marxist should countenance this thought, even if ultimately rejecting it on means-justifying grounds.
What should the French rioters do? They should engage in symbolic property violence if that is their wont; they should agitate, both chaotically and with focus, for worthy partial goals including recognition, redress, and redistribution. Above all, they should act in ways that make it more likely, not less, that other groups (most immediately, other French workers) will recognize their common interests and participate in their struggles. Life-respecting means will be at an advantage in the last pursuit. If a point is reached at which a “totally” worthy (or much less massively partial) goal can be pursued effectively only by means of the sort of violence I have discussed here, it is conceivable that the concerns sketched above will fall away. But I do not see that the groundwork has been laid.
Posted by jane at November 16, 2005 08:54 PM | TrackBack